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Key Points: 22 
 Smartphones used in a fixed network can provide earthquake early warning performance 23 
similar to scientific-grade instrumentation 24 
 Operating in Costa Rica, over 6 months the ASTUTI (Alerta Sismica Temprana 25 
Utilizando Teléfonos Inteligentes; Earthquake Early Warning Utilizing Smartphones) 26 
project detected 5 events that caused wide-spread felt shaking and had 0 false alarms 27 
 The detections and alerts would have provided time for drop-cover-hold-on (DCHO) 28 
protective actions to be taken before S-wave arrival for large percentages of the Costa 29 
Rican population 30 
 2 of the 5 events were triggered by P-waves on the phones, suggesting that smartphone-31 
based EEW could be more effective than previously thought 32 
 33 
 34 
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PEER-REVIEW DISCLAIMER  35 
This draft manuscript is distributed solely for the purpose of scientific peer review. Its 36 
content is merely being considered for publication, so it is not to be disclosed or 37 
released by reviewers. Until the manuscript has been approved for publication by the 38 
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), it does not represent any official USGS finding or 39 
policy.  40 
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Abstract 41 
We show using the ASTUTI (Alerta Sismica Temprana Utilizando Teléfonos Inteligentes) 42 
network  that smartphones deployed in a fixed network can provide Earthquake Early Warning 43 
performance comparable to scientific-grade systems. Using the phones’ accelerometers, we 44 
implement a ground-motion detection and alerting strategy focusing on subduction zone 45 
earthquakes. Our strategy considers that much of the country’s population is concentrated near 46 
the capital San Jose and that nearly the entire population experiences shaking during earthquakes 47 
of ~ Mw 6. Rather than waiting until an earthquake reaches a high intensity, we evaluate issuing 48 
alerts when an acceleration threshold is exceeded at multiple stations. From more than six 49 
months of observations we find data latency is 0.35-0.45 secs. We simulate the 2012 M7.6 50 
Nicoya earthquake using on-phone vibrations and find median first-alert latency of ~9-13 secs 51 
after origin time and alert-receipt latency of ~4 secs. During our assessment there were 13 52 
earthquakes that caused felt shaking. From offline reanalysis, we detected and alerted on 5 of 53 
these, all of which produced felt shaking in San Jose. The system did not produce any false alerts 54 
and undetected events did not produce wide-spread felt shaking. If we alerted the entire 55 
population for each event, 70% and 15% of the population would receive alerts in time to 56 
undertake drop-cover-hold-on for events inside and outside of the network, respectively. 57 
Complementary population ranges would receive alerts and not feel shaking. This strategy may 58 
be effective if users are tolerant of feeling no shaking when they receive alerts from correct 59 
detections.   60 
 61 
Plain Language Summary 62 
We show that a network of smartphones deployed in fixed locations can provide Earthquake 63 
Early Warning performance on par with scientific grade instrumentation. This approach makes 64 
EEW to accessible to resource-limited countries that may have not been to able to previously 65 
benefit from some form of EEW. In particular, combining the fixed-network smartphone sensors 66 
with a strategy targeting low cost of action protective measures such as Drop Cover Hold On 67 
could be very effective.  68 
  69 
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1 Introduction 70 
Earthquake early warning’s (EEW) fundamental promise is that earthquakes can be rapidly 71 
detected so that people and systems can be alerted to take protective action before shaking 72 
arrives at their location [Heaton, 1985]. In order to maximize warning time and to minimize the 73 
population not receiving sufficient warning, EEW requires a dense sensor network so that 74 
earthquakes can be detected closest to wherever they may nucleate. The locations where 75 
earthquakes nucleate and where people reside, however, might be quite removed from one 76 
another. This requirement for dense sensor networks combined with the high cost of expensive 77 
scientific-grade sensors currently limits EEW systems to wealthy countries [Allen and Melgar, 78 
2019]. Alternatively, a new generation of low-cost accelerometer and geodetic sensors [E. S. 79 
Cochran, 2018] could make EEW generally accessible. In particular, utilizing smartphones, 80 
including via crowd-sourcing, is a potentially transformative way to provide EEW [Minson et al., 81 
2015; Finazzi, 2016; Kong et al., 2016].  Although crowd-sourcing removes sensor cost from 82 
EEW budgets, it is fundamentally limited, in contrast to fixed networks,  by its inability to 83 
consistentely leverage the distance between earthquake source regions and population centers. 84 
Smartphones can, of course, also be employed in fixed networks. With fixed networks, 85 
depending on the location of the event and the position of the sensors, all users could potentially 86 
get warnings (Figure 1a). By definition, however, some users in a crowd-sourced EEW system 87 
will never get warnings (Figure 1b). Combining the detection advantage with the low capital and 88 
communications costs of smartphones may make fixed networks the most optimal low-cost EEW 89 
configuration, perhaps even comparable to scientific grade systems. To the best of our 90 
knowledge, however, smartphone fixed network performance has never been examined. In this 91 
paper, with a fixed network in Costa Rica, we demonstrate that judiciously placed smartphones 92 
can provide operational EEW for a country’s population centers at a cost drastically reduced 93 
from, and at a performance level equivalent to, scientific grade instrumentation. 94 
 95 
As with many techno-scientific advances with the potential for large societal impacts, the earliest 96 
projections of EEW system performance and its benefits to society have been modified and 97 
scaled back as EEW’s theoretical, empirical, practical, and social limitations are better 98 
understood  [M A Meier, 2017; Minson et al., 2018; S K McBride et al., 2019; Minson et al., 99 
2019; Nakayachi et al., 2019; Trugman et al., 2019; Becker et al., 2020; S McBride et al., 2020; 100 
David J Wald, 2020b]. To motivate and place in context our work, we review these recent 101 
developments, in particular as they pertain to smartphone-based EEW. 102 
 103 
Ideally, an EEW system would issue actionable alerts prior to P (compressional)-wave arrival, 104 
affording the most time possible for protective actions. Even though a felt P-wave would 105 
hopefully serve as a natural EEW system alerting people to imminent shaking [David J. Wald, 106 
2020a], site and path effects can preclude P-waves being felt ubiquitously, so a minimum 107 
criterion for an EEW system to be effective is for it to deliver alerts prior to the subsequent 108 
arrival of strongest shaking associated with S-waves. Currently, many operational EEW systems 109 
detect earthquakes using some permutation of point-source magnitude estimation from P-wave 110 
information [Chung et al., 2019]. Point-source-based parameter estimation, albeit fast at initial 111 
detections, exhibits degraded performance when events become large and magnitude estimates 112 
saturate [Hoshiba et al., 2010]. Moreover, theoretical studies have recently found that the 113 
conventional EEW approach of using source parameters to forecast shaking causes alerts to be 114 
too slow for higher levels of shaking [M A Meier, 2017; Minson et al., 2018; Trugman et al., 115 
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2019], and to mostly produce missed and false alerts due to the intrinsic variability of ground 116 
motion [Gregor et al., 2014; Minson et al., 2019].  Accordingly, EEW practioners are developing 117 
ground-motion based approaches that issue alerts when one or more stations observe shaking 118 
above a threshold [Kodera et al., 2018; Elizabeth S Cochran et al., 2019]. For instance, by using 119 
strong ground motion that accrues sometime between P- and S-wave arrivals to directly forecast 120 
ground motion, alerts can be issued for strong shaking as soon as it is observed without having to 121 
wait for the rupture (and earthquake magnitude) to grow in size [Kodera et al., 2018; Elizabeth S 122 
Cochran et al., 2019].  123 
 124 
In addition to detection methodology, EEW alerting criteria are also quite variable. Alerting 125 
criteria are complicated by the simple physical fact that earthquake magnitude is not static; 126 
rather, it increases as an earthquake rupture evolves. The promise of EEW systems has been 127 
amplified by the idea that differences between the ways large and small earthquakes start could 128 
potentially be used to predict the final size of a growing earthquake, rather than relying on 129 
rapidly updating contemporaneous estimates of source parameters and ground motion [Olson 130 
and Allen, 2005; Melgar and Hayes, 2019].  However, a growing number of studies have shown 131 
that the early P-wave holds little to no predictive power [M-A Meier et al., 2017; Goldberg et al., 132 
2019; Trugman et al., 2019]. Furthermore, Minson et al (2018) recently showed that given the 133 
velocities at which earthquake ruptures grow and seismic waves propagate, together with the 134 
exponential decay of ground-motion with distance from a propagating rupture, users' warning 135 
time for the strongest shaking will often be brief if EEW systems wait to issue alerts until 136 
earthquakes grow large enough that their forecast shaking is strong. Accordingly, it is becoming 137 
clear that EEW offers the most potential for successful mitigating actions, such as Drop-Cover-138 
Hold-On (DCHO) [Porter and Jones, 2018] to be taken if alert thresholds are set at lower 139 
ground-motion levels than those expected to cause damage [Minson et al., 2018; Saunders et al., 140 
2020].  141 
 142 
Although an EEW system with low alert thresholds would likely produce alerts without 143 
subsequent shaking in some locations, the number of missed alerts would be minimized and the 144 
system would have the best chance of being effective when it mattered most during medium to 145 
larger events. For such a strategy to be successful, however, users must be more tolerant of 146 
receiving unnecessary alerts (the ‘Boy Who Cried Wolf’ phenomena) than is often assumed. 147 
Although there are essentially no studies explicitly addressing the ‘Boy Who Cried Wolf’ 148 
phenomenon for EEW, other scientific communities with more established alerting relationships 149 
with users caution against the implicit assumption that user false alarm tolerance is low 150 
[Roulston and Smith, 2004]. In fact, the small amount of evidence that exists suggests that EEW 151 
users may be false-alarm tolerant. Nakayachi et al (2019), found from surveys associated with 152 
alerts from two Japanese events that, indeed, the user population was surprisingly tolerant of 153 
false alerts. Anecdotal surveys in Mexico found similar attitudes [Allen et al., 2018].  154 
 155 
In this contribution, we implement the ASTUTI (Alerta Sismica Temprana Utilizando Teléfonos 156 
Inteligentes; Earthquake Early Warning Utilizing Smartphones) network in Costa Rica. For 6 157 
months of continuous operation of the 82 station network, we assess the coupling of the fixed 158 
smartphone network with a ground-motion based detection methodology. We evaluate a low-159 
threshold alert strategy that would alert the entire country upon the unambiguous detection of an 160 
event. The spatial distribution of events during the time period appears to be representative of the 161 
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general spatial distribution of Costa Rican seismicity and allows us to examine system 162 
performance for events that occur within and outside of the network. Specifically, for each event, 163 
we quantify the percentage of Costa Rican population that would have sufficient warning time to 164 
undertake DCHO mitigating actions. Finally, all of the raw data collected for this project are 165 
freely available. As commercial entities with proprietary algorithm and data policies are poised 166 
to increase by orders of magnitude the number of smartphone EEW sensors and to issue public-167 
safety alerts themselves [Stogaitis et al., 2020], we assert that it becomes ever more important 168 
that the scientific community have access to transparently collected and freely available 169 
smartphone data.  170 
 171 
 172 
2 Materials and Methods 173 
2.1 System Design 174 
Costa Rica's seismic hazard is due primarily, though not exclusively, to earthquakes generated by 175 
oblique subduction of the Cocos plate below the Caribbean plate at rates up to ~ 8.5 cm/yr along 176 
the Middle America Trench (MAT) [DeMets et al., 2010; Protti et al., 2014](Figure 2). In 177 
contrast to other subduction zones, the portion of the plate interface where MAT earthquakes 178 
tend to nucleate is overlain by land rather than the seafloor [Protti et al., 2014]. Since 1853, 8 179 
earthquakes greater than Mw 7.0 have occurred either on the northern Nicoya (1853, 1900, 1950, 180 
2012) or southern Osa (1856, 1904, 1941, 1983) peninsulas [Kobayashi et al., 2014; Protti et al., 181 
2014]   The majority of Costa Rica’s ~5M population resides in the greater San Jose region, ~60-182 
200 km from the Pacific coast and principal seismogenic zone (Figure 2). For greater San Jose as 183 
well as Costa Rica’s coastal regions, 10% expected peak ground acceleration (PGA) exceedance 184 
over the next 50 years is 0.55-0.90g, in the upper ranges of global seismic hazard [Pagani et al., 185 
2020]. Recently, the Mw 7.6 2012 Nicoya peninsula earthquake caused shaking throughout the 186 
entire country, with PGA values as high as 0.5-1.4g and MMI V-VII reported in San Jose (Figure 187 
2b), and it is generally accepted that M > 6 events are felt country-wide. 188 
 189 
Given Costa Rica’s seismotectonic framework and population distribution we designed the 190 
ASTUTI network with these principles: (1) Our EEW efforts are focused on warning people, not 191 
automated systems, and our targeted user response is DCHO. Because the cost of taking action 192 
for DCHO is so low, this implies that detection and alerting thresholds can be low.  (2) We 193 
prioritize detecting and alerting for MAT earthquakes, the events that have the highest 194 
probability of affecting the largest percentage of the population, especially San Jose. Although 195 
San Jose’s central location exposes it to earthquake sources from the entire country, most non-196 
MAT sources would be too close to San Jose to permit warnings. (3) If we wait to issue an alert 197 
until an event has grown large enough to cause shaking damage, then it will most likely be too 198 
late to issue actionable warnings [Minson et al., 2018; Trugman et al., 2019]. Accordingly we 199 
attempt to issue warnings at the earliest detection of events of potential concern. (4) Because of 200 
local ground-motion variability [Minson et al., 2019] and because it is unlikely that earthquake 201 
ruptures are deterministic [M-A Meier et al., 2017; Goldberg et al., 2019; Trugman et al., 2019] 202 
our detection and alerting is entirely non-parametric. In addition to making no attempt to 203 
estimate source information (such as location and magnitude), the alert does not include 204 
information about predicted ground-motion levels. (5) Based on the previous design principles, 205 
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Costa Rica’s generally small areal extent, and the country-wide shaking from MAT events such 206 
as the 2012 Nicoya event, we do not attempt to designate intra-country warning precints; rather 207 
we evaluate the scenario where every alert will be issued for the entire country. (6) Because of 208 
the previous design priorities, there will likely be a number of alerts issued for smaller events 209 
when users will feel no shaking although an event was correctly detected. This will require rapid 210 
post-event messaging and constant user interaction and education to remind users that the system 211 
performed correctly even if they did not feel shaking [S McBride et al., 2020]. We stress, 212 
however, that, as of January 2021, we are not issuing public alerts, aside from those sent to our 213 
small group of beta testers. We leave thorough investigation of this topic to a future paper. 214 
 215 
2.2 Hardware, Network, and Data Architecture 216 
From September to December 2019 we constructed the ASTUTI network (Figure 2a). For the 217 
duration of the testing period, the network comprised 82 stations. Closest to the MAT and most 218 
of the strongest expected sources, station spacing is ~30 km and it increases to 30-50 km away 219 
from the MAT. Higher station density closer to the subduction zone is similar to the 220 
configuration in Mexico [Espinosa-Aranda et al., 2009; Cuéllar et al., 2017; 2018; Suárez et al., 221 
2018]. Phones are installed on the ground floors of buildings in protective boxes and affixed to 222 
floors or walls (Figure 3). Previously, in addition to accelerometer data from smartphones, we 223 
have discussed and used GNSS, which typically requires outdoor installation [Minson et al., 224 
2015]. We found that many devices overheated, however, so for the initial phase of ASTUTI we 225 
made the operational decision to only employ phones installed on interior walls. Accordingly, 226 
the only data we use for ASTUTI are from on-board accelerometers. To date, our approach 227 
utilizes smartphones with the Android Operating System. Criteria for phone choice included in-228 
country availability and cost (Supp. Mat).  229 
 230 
Onboard the phones, our control and sensing software controls sensor sampling and logging, 231 
detects events, prepares data for use in various downstream processing algorithms, and sends 232 
data in short, labeled messages (Figure 4; Supp. Mat).From December 2019 to late August 2020, 233 
phones streamed at 10 Hz; subsequently we increased streaming rate for the entire network to its 234 
current rate of 100 Hz. At 100 Hz, data rate for each site is ~70-100 Mb/day.As of January 2021 235 
we have collected more than 0.5 Tb of data (please see Acknowledgments, Samples, and Data 236 
section below for information on accessing the archived data). 237 
2.3 Detection Algorithm and Alerting Strategy 238 
Our detection algorithm is a modification of the ground-motion based Propagation of Local 239 
Undamped Motion algorithm [Kodera et al., 2018]. In a polygonal mesh of station locations, we 240 
compensate for the noisier nature of smartphone accelerometers by requiring multiple 241 
neighboring stations to experience anomalous accelerations in order to trigger an alert.  Here, we 242 
report on a quadritlateral mesh configuration because we found an unacceptably large number of 243 
false alerts for triangular configurations. The station locations are organized into a set of unique, 244 
overlapping polygons whose sides are all less than a configurable length (currently 40 km). Once 245 
per second PGA values are measured at each station and the values are compared with a primary 246 
threshold (currently 0.6%g). If any station's PGA is above the threshold, the polygon it belongs 247 
to is marked as potentially triggered. The PGA values at each of the remaining stations in that 248 
polygon are compared with a secondary threshold (currently 0.55%g). If PGA values at all 249 
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stations in a potentially triggered polygon are above the thresholds, an alert is issued. If not, the 250 
incoming PGA values continue to be monitored for up to 15 seconds (configurable), and the 251 
polygon will trigger if the remaining station PGA values rise above the secondary PGA 252 
threshold. Otherwise, the polygon times out, and no alert is triggered. Once a polygon is 253 
triggered, an alert is sent out using a cloud-based notification system (Amazon Web Services 254 
Simple Notification System). As of January 2021, alerts are only being sent to a small number of 255 
beta-subscribers in our research team.  256 
 257 
3 Data Quality and System Latency 258 
Below, we characterize the system’s data quality and latency during a six month evaluation 259 
period from December 2019 to June 2020. Generally, during this time, daily system up-time 260 
(defined as the percentage of each day the entire network was transimitting data) was reliably 261 
greater than 95%. After June 2020, as Covid-19 pandemic restrictions significantly limited travel 262 
in Costa Rica, we were not able to visit stations for routine or time-dependent site visits. 263 
Accordingly, station up-time and network coverage decreased during this period. In the 264 
Supporting Information section we provide more details about system operation. 265 
3.1 Data Quality 266 
As with any seismic sensor, coupling to the ground and site-specific noise conditions control an 267 
individual phone’s sensitivity. MEMS accelerometers in smart-phones have been shown to have 268 
the sensitivity to discriminate ground motions caused by earthquakes from background noise 269 
[Evans et al., 2014] even in crowd-sourcing scenarios where they rest on tables [Finazzi, 2016; 270 
Kong et al., 2016; Finazzi and Fassò, 2017; Kong et al., 2019b]. In our fixed-network approach, 271 
phones do not rest on tables nor are they placed in seismically quiet underground vaults, rather 272 
they are affixed to floors, baseboards, and walls in built structures, typically homes, schools, fire 273 
departments, hospitals, or municipal buildings (Figure 3). As such, they record accelerations 274 
through the filter of a built structure emplaced in locally varying soil and/or rock substrate. This 275 
type of installation means that individual stations will record earthquakes (Figure 5a) as well as 276 
ambient non-seismic accelerations from myriad sources such as road traffic, domestic motion, or 277 
thunder [Finazzi, 2020]. In addition to site-specific noise, we have found that some phones 278 
experience sporadic, unexplained, transient noise spikes, either on individual or multiple 279 
accelerometer components simultaneously (Figure 5b).  280 
 281 
We combine the raw acceleration data from the three orthogonal accelerometers into a PGA data 282 
type (the ‘P’ message) sampled and sent at 1 Hz. The data value is the vector norm of the 283 
individually de-meaned 100 Hz acceleration values and has units of m/s
2
, also expressed as a 284 
percent of gravitational acceleration, %g.  To mitigate transient noise spikes while permitting 285 
real seismic accelerations to pass, we implement a simple filter that takes the 30
th
 percent highest 286 
value in a 1 second window (3
rd
 highest if accelerometer sampling is 10 Hz, 30
th
 highest if 287 
accelerometer sampling is 100 Hz; Figure 5b) [Kamigaichi et al., 2009]. 288 
 289 
Because the detection algorithm only requires exceedance of ground acceleration above a 290 
threshold, we characterize site and network data quality by examining histograms of PGA data. 291 
Generally, the entire network exhibits mean values of 0.25%g. Over periods of time varying 292 
from minutes to days, individual stations may experience elevated deviations from this 293 
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background behavior (Figure 6). The causes of these transient periods of elevated background 294 
noise are varied and likely related to temporally changing site-specific noise such as local 295 
construction projects, changing traffic patterns, or persistent regional storms.  296 
3.2 Latency Budget  297 
Understanding and documenting the latency budget, along with assessing alert validity, is a 298 
critical  aspect of EEW system operation. We define ASTUTI system latency, tlatency, as the sum 299 
of three components tlatency = tdata  + tdetect + talert where tdata is the time it takes for data to be 300 
transmitted from the phones and received by the hub, tdetect is the time it takes for a given 301 
processing algorithm to detect an event, and talert is the time it takes for a message to be received 302 
by a user after it has been sent by the processing algorithm. Of these, tdata and talert are only 303 
dependent on telecommunications factors and they are independent of the specifics of a given 304 
earthquake event. For different earthquakes, tdetect depends on multiple factors including 305 
magnitude, rise-time, hypocentral location, near-source network geometry, and local site 306 
acceleration response.  These factors will control the time it takes for seismic waves to travel 307 
from an earthquake to be sensed by a phone, the time it takes for a site to exceed detection 308 
thresholds, and the time it takes a particular algorithm to issue a detection. 309 
 310 
From six months of continuously-streamed data, we find that tdata varies from 0.35 to 0.45 311 
seconds depending on time of day; peak internet usage (early evening when people arrive home 312 
from work) also correlates with higher tdata (Figure 7a). For comparison, published tdata for the 313 
Italian [Satriano et al., 2011], the Chinese [Zhang et al., 2016], and ShakeAlert [Elizabeth S 314 
Cochran et al., 2018] EEW networks are 0.9, 2, and 1-3 secs, respectively. 315 
 316 
In order to robustly and simultaneously measure the real-time distribution of  tdetect and talert, as 317 
well as to test the full operation of the ASTUTI EEW system, we used smarpthones’ 318 
programmable vibration feature to cause the phones to shake at expected relative arrival times 319 
for a scenario earthquake. We use the M7.6 2012 Nicoya earthquake as a scenario event and 320 
program S-wave arrival time for each site calculating hypocentral distance (see methods) using a 321 
fixed move-out value for Vs of 3.2 km/s (Figure 7b-d).  Each phone vibrated for ~10 seconds.  322 
Although they certainly do not reproduce the frequency nor amplitude content of real seismic 323 
waves interacting with built structures, smartphone vibrations are decent proxies for local 324 
earthquake accelerations in that they exceed the threshold values we use for earthquake detection 325 
at specified times consistent with the earthquake rupture evolution and seismic wave propagation 326 
(Figure 7c). Of course, the model of seismic wave propagation for the event could be more 327 
sophisticated but the constant Vs value is sufficient for the purpose of estimating average values 328 
of tdetect and talert. Note here we use S-wave arrival times to be conservative, but it is possible 329 
that trigger thresholds could be exceeded in the P-wave (see System Performance below). 330 
 331 
Over a period of 3 days, we repeated the test, vibrating the phones on the Nicoya peninsula three 332 
times an hour at the M7.6 scenario relative times, resulting in a total of 216 simulations (Figure 333 
7d). For this scenario, we find tdetect has a mean value of ~12-13 seconds. We measured talert by 334 
sending text message alerts to a set of 15 people with cell phones in and around the greater San 335 
Jose region. We find mean value for talert is ~4 seconds (Figure 7d). Because this is from a small 336 
number of phones that were relatively close together, it is not clear how representative this 337 
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metric is of latencies that would occur when sending many thousands of alerts across a wider 338 
geographic region. For comparison we note, that in a recent test of ShakeAlert in San Diego 339 
county using the U.S. federal Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system [Minson et al., 2020], 340 
median talert was ~13 seconds. To the best of our knowledge no other smartphone EEW projects 341 
have reported alerting latency data [Finazzi, 2016; Kong et al., 2016; Finazzi and Fassò, 2017; 342 
Kong et al., 2018; Kong et al., 2019a; Kong et al., 2019b; Finazzi, 2020; Kong et al., 2020].  343 
 344 
4 System Performance 345 
4.1 Event Accuracy and Timeliness 346 
We evaluate ASTUTI’s performance in both detecting earthquakes and delivering alerts to 347 
people who will potentially experience shaking for a given earthquake, based on off-line 348 
playback from Dec 2019 to June 2020. Because of Covid-19 related travel restrictions limiting 349 
field work and equipment maintenance, and because of algorithm tuning and development of our 350 
alert messaging algorithm, the entire system was not operational until August 2020. 351 
We use Did You Feel It (DYFI) data to provide both a self-consistent metric and the most natural 352 
ground-truth for whether people in a given region experienced shaking [Atkinson and Wald, 353 
2007]. If, alternatively, our objective were to evaluate performance for non-human ‘users’ such 354 
as critical facilities, lifeline, and/or structures, then DYFI reports would be less appropriate than 355 
instrumental strong-motion measurements such as ShakeMaps [David J Wald, 2000]. 356 
 357 
During the period of assessment, we detected 5 of the 13 events (Mw 4-5.3) that were 358 
accompanied by DYFI reports of shaking somewhere in Costa Rica (Figure 8, Figure S1, Table 359 
S1). The majority of these events (9 of 13) occurred outside of the network, either offshore in the 360 
MAT or within neighboring Panama’s international borders (Figure S1). Four of the detected 361 
events had thrust mechanisms and one had a strike-slip mechanism and they ranged in magnitude 362 
from from Mw 4.8 to Mw 5.3. Only one of the detected events (2020-03-07, Mw 5.2) had an 363 
epicenter entirely within the network (Figure 8d, 8d). Generally, the ASTUTI-detected events 364 
were accompanied by stronger shaking that was felt by much larger percentages of the 365 
population as defined by interpolated DYFI reports. The detected events had a median MMI of 366 
4.3 and a max MMI of 6 with  ~17% to 73% (41% median) of the population experiencing felt 367 
shaking of at least MMI 2-3.  In contrast, the non-detected events had median MMI of 2.9 and 368 
max MMI of 3.8 with  0 to 19% (0.002% median) of the population experiencing felt shaking of 369 
at least MMI 2-3.  370 
 371 
For each detected event, in addition to the associated DYFI data we plot the estimated position of 372 
the S-wave front (assumed to be the front of peak shaking) at the time that the alert was issued 373 
(solid magenta circles in Figure 8). Detection times,tdetect, ranged from 11-30 secs (median 22 374 
secs, Table 1, Figure 8)..  The 11-30 second range of detection times compares well with other 375 
scientific grade systems constructed and operated in similar seismic hazard settings, such as 376 
Cascadia and Mexico. For Cascadia, in 2019-2020 Shake Alert issued 4 alerts with tdetect timing 377 
ranging from 8.3-13.9 seconds [ShakeAlertEventPage, 2020]. Published tdetect values from 378 
Mexico for 3 events range from 12-18 seconds [Cuéllar et al., 2018] and, although not explicitly 379 
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presented, we estimate from data presented in a recent performance summary [Cuéllar et al., 380 
2017] that minimum tdetect is ~ 8 seconds.  381 
 382 
For each detected event we plot record sections for each station’s recorded P message and the 383 
expected range of P- and S-wave velocities of 6 to 3 km/s, respectively (Figure 9). We find that 2 384 
of the 5 events (2019-12-08 and 2020-03-07, Figure 9a,b and Figure 9g,h) triggered on the P 385 
wave, which can be seen by the magenta vertical line occurring on the left side of the record 386 
section plots. For each of these events, all four of the triggering stations exceeded the threshold 387 
(0.6 g for the first and 0.55 %g for subsequent stations;shown in dashed green lines on the right 388 
panel in each figure). The three remaining events triggered with the S-wave. For all of the events 389 
aside from that on 2020-03-07, ~ 10 seconds elapsed between the first and fourth station 390 
surpassing the threshold. For the 2020-03-07 event, only 2 seconds elapsed, because the 2020-391 
03-07 event was entirely within the network and so spreading seismic waves from the sub-392 
surface event arrived much more synchronously at the sensors than for events with offshore 393 
hypocenters. 394 
 395 
4.2 Shaking 396 
In addition to reporting the detection times we also assess the likely warning outcomes for 397 
population percentages [Tatem, 2017] for the case where the warning precinct for a detected 398 
event is the entire Costa Rican population (Figure 8). We interpolate the spatial distribution of 399 
DYFI reports to define an area of felt shaking, reasoning that it is likely ground-shaking occurred 400 
between sites of reported shaking [Kodera et al., 2018; Elizabeth S Cochran et al., 2019]. 401 
Although DYFI data contains uncertainty from humans’ perceptional subjectivity [Goltz et al., 402 
2020], we minimize this by applying a binary “shaking” or “no-shaking” classification to DYFI 403 
reports. We contend this is a conservative approach in that, for a given earthquake, the area of 404 
felt shaking represented by DFYI data is an under- rather than over-estimation: it seems more 405 
likely that people who felt shaking would not report it rather than that people would report felt 406 
shaking when none was felt. We categorize outcomes as True Positive-Shaking (TP-S): the 407 
system correctly detects an event and a user receives an alert prior to felt shaking; True Positive-408 
No Shaking (TP-NS): the system correctly detects an event, a user receives an alert but does not 409 
feel shaking; No Alert (NA): the system correctly detects an event, but a user does not receive an 410 
alert prior to shaking; False Alert (FA): the system incorrectly detects an event and sends an 411 
alert, no shaking occurs anywhere; and Missed Alert (MA): a felt event occurs but the system 412 
does not issue an alert. For each of these scenarios, to permit conservative evaluation of when 413 
users could expect to receive warning messages, in the plots we add totdetect 5 seconds, ~1 414 
second more than the median value of talert from the vibration tests (see section 3.2).  415 
 416 
Over the 6 months of evaluation, 15.5-71.0% (median 38.5%) of the population would have 417 
received TP-S outcomes, 27.1-83% (median 52.8 %) would have TP-NS outcomes, and 4.9-8.8% 418 
(median 2.5%) would have NA outcomes (Table 1). Outcomes can be grouped further according 419 
to onshore (in-network) and offshore (out-of-network) source categories. For the onshore events 420 
(12/8/19, 3/7/20, and 3/13/20) more time after warning is received is generally available 421 
becausetdetect is, on average, 10 seconds faster than the two offshore events (1/21/20a,b) and 422 
because the events on either the Nicoya or Osa peninsulas are far enough away from population 423 
concentrations (Figure 8a,d,e). Interestingly, however, the two off-shore events yield the largest 424 
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TP-S outcomes because Costa Rica’s population is concentrated in and around the capital city, 425 
San Jose, near the center of the country and more than 100 km from these events (Table 1).  426 
 427 
4.3 Missed & False Alerts 428 
In order to analyze a self-consistent dataset of felt shaking, we further classify MAs to be events 429 
for which the system did not produce an alert but that produced enough shaking for people to file 430 
DYFI reports. This is a minimum number as there may be other, smaller events that were felt but 431 
for which no DYFI reports were filed.  During the period of evaluation there were 8 such MAs  432 
with a range of Mw 4-5 (Table S1, Figure S1). Six of these MAs were located well outside of the 433 
network (Figure S1). Of the remaining two, only one (12-31-2020, Mw 4) was located entirely 434 
within the network, the other (4-17-2020, Mw 4) was located on the Pacific coast at the edge of 435 
the network. For these events, less than 0.5% of the population reported shaking and the reported 436 
shaking never exceeded MMI III (Figure S1).  437 
 438 
False alerts (FAs) can occur because of system glitches or non-seismic local or regional 439 
accelerations. From our time period of analysis we identified two types of system glitch sources 440 
that affected three or more neighboring stations nearly simulateously. The first is unexpected 441 
phone vibration because of user error when programming the vibration tests. The second is 442 
regional power-grid instability causing AC electricity fluctuations that, in turn, cause multiple 443 
phones to unexpectedly vibrate simultaneously when they re-start as the regional AC power 444 
cycles off and on. Once they are identified, these are relatively straightforward FA sources to 445 
mitigate in real-time by better accounting of programmed vibrations and by identifying and 446 
excluding sites experiencing regional power cycling. Real, non-earthquake accelerations from 447 
sources such as vehicles passing on the street, thunder shaking a structure, or people moving 448 
furniture near the phone installation are more difficult to mitigate. As the number of vertices in 449 
the triggering criteria is increased, the probability of regionally simultaneous non-seismic 450 
accelerations decreases. In our early tests we found that it was necessary to include more than 451 
three stations in the detection algorithm to mitigate the effect of these types of unwanted 452 
accelerations on alert generation.  453 
 454 
During the evaluation period, once system glitches were identified and noisy stations removed, 455 
we eliminated all FAs yielding a FA rate of 0%.  This is similar performance to the result from 456 
offline runs on West Coast U.S. data of the ground-motion based algorithm from which ours is 457 
derived (Cochran, et al. 2019). For further comparison, published FA rates for science-grade 458 
EEW networks range from 2.5% in Taiwan [Xu et al., 2017] to 8% for Shake Alert [Kohler et 459 
al., 2020]. The Japanese system reported many FAs after the 2011 M 9 Tohoku earthquake but to 460 
the best our knowledge has not published a FA rate [Hoshiba, 2014]. For smartphone EEW, the 461 
Earthquake Network Project sets detection thresholds so that they do not exceed 1 FA per year, 462 
per country [Finazzi, 2020]. This approach is a way to balance the often competing objectives of 463 
minimizing both MAs and FAs. The MyShake project has not reported FA rate, stating that “the 464 
false positive events are not so well quantified, because we do not have a large number of false 465 
positive samples from the system” [Kong et al., 2020]. 466 
 467 
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5 Discussion 468 
Our investigation demonstrates for the first time that off-the-shelf smartphones deployed in a 469 
fixed network can reliably and effectively provide operational EEW for a country with Costa 470 
Rica’s size and population. Performance metrics for the ASTUTI network compare favorably 471 
with scientific-grade EEW, at least during the six months of evaluation. Data latency is lower 472 
than some science grade networks and detection latency is similar albeit slightly higher due to 473 
the ground-motion based detection method triggering usually on S-waves. The spatial 474 
distribution of earthquakes that occurred during the evaluation period appears to be 475 
representative of the spatial distribution of the earthquakes expected to do the most damage in 476 
Costa Rica (with the exception of the southern Caribbean region) and so it is likely that similar 477 
ASTUTI performance could be expected over longer time intervals.   478 
 479 
There is a marked cost differential between the fixed network smartphone approach and science 480 
grade networks. Capital costs for the entire ASTUTI network were ~USD 22,000 and annual 481 
operating and maintenance costs are  ~USD 20,000 (not ~ 1-2 full-time equivalent salaries). For 482 
comparison, ShakeAlert capital costs are close to USD 100 million and annual operating costs 483 
are ~ USD 39 million [Given et al., 2018]. When normalized by population for Costa Rica (~5 484 
M) and combined populations of California, Oregon, and Washington (~52 M), ASTUTI’s 485 
capital costs are 450 times less and annual operating costs are 192 times less than Shake Alert’s. 486 
When normalized by area for the same regions (~51,100 km
2
 and ~863,000 km
2
, respectively), 487 
ASTUTI’s capital costs are 279 times less and annual operating costs are 119 times less than 488 
Shake Alert’s. Increasing station density by ~ 30% such that four stations would cover the area 489 
that three stations currently cover (at a cost of less than ~USD 10,000) could probably decrease 490 
tdetect by 3-5 seconds.  491 
 492 
The ASTUTI strategy of warning the entire country upon detection of any event would permit 493 
warnings to reach large percentages of the population (15-70% TP outcome) for the earthquakes 494 
that “mattered”, that is, earthquakes that caused enough shaking for people to submit DYFI 495 
reports. The detected events had median and maximum MMI levels of 4.3 and 6 with  ~17% to 496 
73% (41% median) of the population experiencing felt shaking. In contrast, the non-detected 497 
events had median and max MMI levels of 2.9 and 3.8 with  0 to 19% (0.002% median) of the 498 
population experiencing felt shaking. For smaller and sufficiently out-of-network events that did 499 
not trigger alerts, less than 0.5% of the population reported shaking and the reported shaking 500 
never exceeded MMI 3. These population outcomes are a function of the spatial distribution of 501 
event locations, station density, and population spatial distribution. For example, for events that 502 
nucleate on the Nicoya or Osa peninsulas, the detecting stations are far enough away from 503 
population concentrations to afford more people time to receive warnings and undertake 504 
mitigating actions. Consistent with the results of the vibration test for the 2012 M7.6 Nicoya 505 
earthquake scenario, this suggests that the approach could work well for the case of subduction 506 
zone events of significant size (>M7).   507 
 508 
ASTUTI’s 0% FA rate is lower than all other EEW systems’ reported FA rates aside from 509 
retrospective testing of ground-motin based detection with West Coast U.S. data [Elizabeth S 510 
Cochran et al., 2019]. Our examination was only over six months, however, and so more 511 
operational time is required for a longer-term, more representative FA rate.  As expected, a low 512 
detection threshold criterion combined with a country-wide alerting region also leads to 513 
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significant population percentages (20-80%) where an alert was received and no was shaking 514 
experienced (TP-NS outcomes). TP-NS percentage could be reduced by modifying our alerting 515 
philosophy to include shaking estimation from source-parameter characterization; however, we 516 
suggest that the benefit of attempting a more refined warning may be outweighed by the added 517 
uncertainty associated with EEW parameter estimation and ground-motion prediction [Minson et 518 
al., 2018; Minson et al., 2019]. It is not clear what penalty there may be in terms of user 519 
engagement if an EEW system provides alerts without felt shaking, especially if users were to 520 
receive a rapid follow-on message stating that an event had been correctly detected although they 521 
did not feel shaking.  In fact, the general population may appreciate receiving an alert whenever 522 
an earthquake occured, even if no one felt it [Nakayachi et al., 2019]. Indeed, we are at the very 523 
early stages of studying the nuanced relationships between EEW system performance and human 524 
sentiment. Given this evolving understanding, a clear high-priority must be EEW pre- and post-525 
event education and messaging [S McBride et al., 2020].  526 
 527 
Given the concentration of Costa Rica’s population in San Jose (> 90%), it is useful to assess 528 
DCHO feasibility for the greater metro region. S-wave arrival in San Jose for the three onshore 529 
or near-shore events (2019-12-08, 2020-03-07, 2020-03-13) was between ~30 and 50 seconds 530 
after median receipt of alert time (tdetect  + 5 seconds) (Figure 8a,d,e) . For the offshore events 531 
(2020-01-21a, 2020-01-21b) the S-wave arrival was much sooner, a few seconds after median 532 
receipt of alert time (Figure 8b,c). Thus, for three of the five detected events, our results suggest 533 
that DCHO for a large percentage of San Jose residents is an achievable objective. For the two 534 
offshore events DCHO may not be a widely achieveable objective. Because there is a paucity of 535 
studies that have directly evaluated DCHO, however, there is some uncertainty in assessing 536 
EEW users’ likely response. For instance, for the HayWired exercise [Porter and Jones, 2018], 537 
DCHO took 5-15 seconds and for a New Zealand ShakeOut exercise DCHO timing varied from 538 
10-30 seconds (64% of participants took less than 10 seconds and 34% took 11-30 secs) [S K 539 
McBride et al., 2019]. For two actual shaking events, however, Nakayashi et al (2019) report that 540 
taking no action was the most common outcome for people who received EEW alerts. This 541 
uncertainty highlights the often counter-intuitive nature of humans’ interaction with automated 542 
warning systems and stresses the importance of further mitigation education and social science 543 
studies targeting DCHO activities. 544 
 545 
Faster detection times for EEW systems using higher-grade sensors is due primarily to P-wave 546 
based detection [Cuéllar et al., 2018; Chung et al., 2019]. We identify P-waves in the 547 
acceleration records of individual stations for all 5 detected events (Figure 9) and, notably, two 548 
of the five events were detected as the result of triggers in the P-waves. Accordingly, although 549 
ground-motion-based algorithms may be more likely to trigger on S-waves for moderate-sized 550 
events, there is no a priori requirement of this. Faster warnings could occur for larger events, 551 
such as the Mw 5.2 2020-03-07 event where P arrivals triggered the event and are seen in the 552 
records of many stations (Figure 9d). Additionally, as future generation MEMs accelerometers 553 
become more sensitive, detection on the P wave could become more likely, although trigger 554 
thresholds have to be carefully considered given the noise levels at station locations. A better 555 
understanding of the relationship between expected P wave amplitudes and their spatial 556 
coherence for a variety of events would allow for improved predictions of the performance of 557 
accelerometer-based EEW. 558 
 559 
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As pointed out by others [David J Wald, 2020b], updating construction codes and practices as 560 
well as promoting more widespread and thorough acceptance of simple mitigation actions such 561 
as DCHO deserve to be considered top priorities for earthquake-related resource allocation. The 562 
ASTUTI fixed network EEW approach is so inexpensive, however, that it need not interfere with 563 
other budgetary priorities for countries that do not have the resources to maintain advanced 564 
seismic networks but that could benefit from some form of EEW. Myriad implementation 565 
scenarios could be envisioned ranging from stand-alone smartphone networks to hybrid 566 
augmentations of preexisiting scientific-grade instrumentation. Futhermore, the approach is so 567 
inexpensive that the sensing and detection benefits of judiciously placed sensors outweighs the 568 
even lower costs associated with crowd-sourcing. We note that in no way do we discount crowd-569 
sourcing’s value, especially the potential contribution to ground-motion and structural seismic 570 
response studies of massive numbers of crowd-source acceleration records [Kong et al., 2018]. 571 
Moreover, as digital home assistants become more ubiquitous, crowd-sourcing efforts (users 572 
permitting access to their personal devices) will move to fixed network modes. Especially for 573 
resource-limited populations, however, the day is still years away when user-contributed data 574 
will be spatially complete enough and temporally reliable enough to provide robust EEW 575 
capability for a larger population. With smartphone-based EEW in a nascent phase of rapid 576 
growth, we stress the need for continued scientific investigation and validation of these 577 
methodologies by the global community. Especially given the need for transparency when issues 578 
of public safety are concerned, we encourage open-access data policies for smartphone-based 579 
EEW systems. 580 
6 Conclusions 581 
We have demonstrated that a fixed-network of smartphones using a ground-motion-based 582 
detection algorithm can provide operational EEW at a cost that is generally 1-2 orders of 583 
magnitude less than scientific-grade networks. The ASTUTI combination of detection capability 584 
with a country-wide alerting strategy demonstrates an effective EEW strategy for the common 585 
earthquake hazard setting where large population centers are close enough to be affected by large 586 
earthquakes but far enough away from them so that alerts may arrive in time to permit simple 587 
protective actions such as DCHO. More social science research is needed to ascertain whether 588 
populations will be tolerant of a system that correctly detects events and that sends alerts to users 589 
who do not necessarily feel shaking. 590 
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Figure 1. Cartoon depicting fixed-network (a) and crowd-sourced (b) EEW warning times for 753 
two population centers for a hypothetical earthquake (red star). The red circle indicates the time 754 
when the event is detected. With a fixed-network, the event is detected by nearby sensors located 755 
in zones of sparse population and both population centers could receive warning. With crowd-756 
sourcing, the first population center’s smartphones are used as the detectors and so it does not 757 
receive a warning. Moreover, the warning time for the 2
nd
 population center is reduced from the 758 
what the fixed-network could have provided. 759 
 760 
Figure 2. Costa Rica seismotectonic framework, population distribution, ASTUTI network, and 761 
the M7.6 2012 Nicoya peninsula earthquake. Basemap, WorldMap 1 km gridded population 762 
(copper colormap) and shaded topography and bathymetry (blue and gray colormaps). (a) 763 
Colored circles, earthquakes in the NEIC catalog from August 15, 2000 to June 3, 2020, colored 764 
by magnitude. White triangles, ASTUTI smartphone locations. MAT, Middle America Trench. 765 
SJ, San Jose city. (b) Beachball, focal mechanism of the 2012 Nicoya earthquake. Colored grid 766 
cells, Did You Feel It (DYFI) Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) values from the 2012 Nicoya 767 
earthquake.  768 
 769 
Figure 3. A typical ASTUTI station. (a) Photo showing the smartphone enclosure affixed to a 770 
wall. (b) Photo inside the enclosure of the smartphone screen showing the QED software 771 
application display. 772 
 773 
Figure 4. Schematic diagram of the ASTUTI approach. The general flow of alerting data and 774 
information is clockwise starts in the Device Networks box and end in the Alert System box. 775 
QED, ‘Quick Event Detection’ smartphone software. NTP, network time protocol. UDP, user 776 
datagram protocol . MQTT, message queuing telemetry transport. API, application programming 777 
interface. MySQL, My structure queried language.  778 
 779 
Figure 5. Examples of raw accelerometer and PGA data types from one station.  Black, raw 780 
accelerometer data. V, vertical axis; H1, horizontal axis; H2, horizontal axis. Blue, P, processed 781 
PGA data message. (a) Example of  how the PGA data type preserves the signal of 3 small 782 
earthquakes at 0, ~75 and ~210 seconds. (b) Example of  how the PGA data type suppresses 783 
noise spikes at ~ 0 seconds.  784 
 785 
Figure 6. Histogram of PGA values for one station for one day (gray) and one hour (red). The 786 
current triggering threshold is 0.6%g. 787 
 788 
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Figure 7. ASTUTI system latency and M7.6 Nicoya scenario vibration  test. (a) Hourly 789 
distribution of data latency, tdata, for the 6 month observation period. Each column represents 790 
the median tdata probability distribution function for an hour of the day.  (b) Location map (as in 791 
Figure 2a) showing the M7.6 Nicoya scenario vibration test. Red star, epicenter. Magenta circle,  792 
S-wave position at the time,tdetect, the time the event was detected. Green triangles, the stations 793 
that triggered the alert. (c) P-message record section from the vibration test. Stations are ordered 794 
with distance from the epicenter. Hypocentral distance shown in blue text. (d) Histograms of 795 
time to detection,tdetect (top) and time to receipt of alert,talert, (bottom) for all 216 vibration 796 
tests. 797 
Figure 8. ASTUTI results from the 5 detected earthquakes. Each plot has the same symbology 798 
and nomenclature. Title with white box, origin time and magnitude of the event from 799 
OVSICORI. Magenta-box title, tdetect. Magenta solid circle, estimated position of S-wave 800 
(3.2km/s) at timetdetect.  Magenta dashed circle, estimated position of S-wave 20 seconds after 801 
timetdetect. 20 seconds represents ~5 seconds for alerting time,talert (see Figure 6d) and 15 802 
seconds for protective action such as Drop-Cover-Hold-On (DCHO). Green filled triangles, four 803 
stations that triggered the alert. White solid triangles, active stations at time of event. White 804 
empty triangles, inactive stations at time of event. Colored grid squares, DYFI cells. Hot 805 
population colormap, population % True-positive (TP) outcomes. Gray population colormap, % 806 
No-alert (NA). Copper population colormap, % True-positive no-shaking (TP-NS). (a) 12 807 
December 2019 Mw 4.8. (b) 21 January 2020a Mw 5.3. (c) 21 January 2020b Mw 5.2. (d) 7 March 808 
2020 Mw 5.2.  (e) 13 March 2020 Mw 5.0.   809 
Figure 9. PGA, P-message, record section for the 5 detected earthquakes. Each plot has the same 810 
symbology, nomenclature, and scale. The left column shows all stations for a particular event, 811 
the right column shows a zoomed image of only the triggering stations. Stations are ordered with 812 
distance from the epicenter. Hypocentral distance shown in blue along the vertical axis. 813 
Triggering stations, thick black. Other stations, black. Triggering time, magenta line. Pink 814 
shading, ranges of 6 and 3 km/s for P- and S-wave arrival times, respectively. (a,b) 12 December 815 
2019 Mw 4.8. (c,d) 21 January 2020a Mw 5.3. (e,f) 21 January 2020b Mw 5.2. (g,h) 7 March 2020 816 
Mw 5.2.  (i) 13 March 2020 Mw 5.0.   817 
Table 1. Alerting outcomes for each detected event. See also Figures 7 and 8. Time to 818 
detection,tdetect. TP%, percent of population with True-positive outcomes. TP-NS%, percent of 819 
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2019-12-08 13 15.5 83 1.5 
2020-01-21a 29 63.6 28.1 8.3 
2020-01-21b 30 38.4 52.8 8.8 
2020-03-07 11 71 27.1 1.8 
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